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Decoy-state quantum key distribution is a standard tool for long-distance quantum communica-
tions. An important issue in this field is processing the decoy-state statistics taking into account
statistical fluctuations (or “finite-key effects”). In this work, we propose and analyze an option for
decoy statistics processing, which is based on the central limit theorem. We discuss such practical
issues as inclusion of the failure probability of the decoy-states statistical estimates in the total
failure probability of a QKD protocol and also taking into account the deviations of the binomially
distributed random variables used in the estimations from the Gaussian distribution. The results of
numerical simulations show that the obtained estimations are quite tight. The proposed technique
can be used as a part of post-processing procedures for industrial quantum key distribution systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) as the main part of
quantum cryptography is known to provide information-
theoretic (or unconditional) security of key distribution.
However, QKD protocols like BB84 assume the employ
of single-photon sources [1]. In contrast, real-life imple-
mentations of QKD setups are based on attenuated laser
pulses instead of true single photons [2–5]. This realiza-
tion makes QKD vulnerable to various attacks, such as
the photon number splitting attack [3–7]. A well-known
tool for solving this problem is the decoy-state method,
which can be considered as a standard technique used in
many QKD realizations [8–14]. The decoy-state method
uses laser pulses with different intensities. The intensi-
ties are chosen from a certain finite set. The choices for
the pulses are kept in secret by the legitimate sender (Al-
ice), but are publicly announced after the reception of all
pulses by the legitimate receiver (Bob). By analyzing (i)
statistics of reception for pulses with different intensities
and (ii) error rates for different intensities, one can esti-
mate the fraction of single-photon pulses and the error
rate for single-photon pulses. In particular, this allows
detection of the photon number splitting attack [8–14].
An important task in the framework of the decoy-state
QKD is to take into account statistical fluctuations (so
called “finite-key effects”). Several methods are proposed
in the literature, including those based on the central
limit theorem [11], Chernoff–Hoefding method [12, 13],
and improved Chernoff–Hoefding method [14].
In the present work, we propose and analyze an option
for processing decoy-state statistics based on the central
limit theorem. Namely, we derive expressions for statis-
tical estimations of the fraction of positions (bits) in the
verified key obtained from single-photon pulses and the
error rate in such positions. They are further used in
calculations of the length of the secret (final) key with a
given tolerable failure probability. We also provide the
results of numerical simulations, which show that these
estimations are quite tight. It should be mentioned that
the methods based on the central limit theorem are crit-
icized as not sufficiently rigorous [14]. However, we es-
timate the deviations from the Gaussian distribution in
a rigorous way using the results of Ref. [15]. Another
important practical issue that we discuss is the accurate
inclusion of the failure probability of the decoy states
statistical estimates into the formula for the total failure
probability. We note that our analysis uses the decoy-
state QKD protocol, which is described in Ref. [10].
Our work is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the basics of the QKD post-processing procedure.
In Sec. III, we present the suggested method for process-
ing of decoy-state statistics based on the central limit
theorem. In Sec. IV, we use numerical simulations in or-
der to compare the obtained estimations with theoretical
limits of the decoy-state QKD protocol. In Sec. V, we
estimate the deviations of the random variables used in
our processing procedure from the Gaussian distribution.
We summarize the main results in Sec. VI.
II. QKD POST-PROCESSING PROCEDURE
The operating QKD protocol can be divided into sev-
eral stages. On the first quantum stage of a QKD pro-
tocol, Alice sends quantum states to Bob, who measures
them. After the quantum stage Alice and Bob have two
binary strings, the so-called raw keys. The second stage
is the use of post-processing procedures. Let us recall the
basic stages of post processing the raw keys for the BB84
QKD protocol (for details, see Refs. [2–5, 16–18]):
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2(i) Sifting : Alice and Bob announce the bases they
used for the preparation and measurement of quan-
tum states and drop the positions with inconsistent
bases from the raw keys. The resulting keys are
called the sifted keys. The decoy-states statistics is
announced at this stage as well.
(ii) Information reconciliation, also known as error cor-
rection: This entails removing discrepancies be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys via communi-
cation over the authenticated channel (for the last
issues concerning the adaptation of error-correcting
codes for QKD, see Ref. [19]). Often this stage is
completed by a verification procedure: one legiti-
mate side send a hash-tag of his or her key to the
other side to ensure the coincidence of their keys
after the error correction. The blocks of the sifted
keys which fail the verification test are discarded at
this state. The resulting common key is called the
verified key.
(iii) Parameter estimation: this is the estimation of the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the sifted keys.
Also, processing the decoy states statistics is per-
formed on this stage.
(iv) Privacy amplification: the possible information ob-
tained by an eavesdropper (Eve) about the keys is
reduced to a negligible value This is achieved by a
special contraction of the verified key into a shorter
key. For such contractions, 2-universal hash func-
tions are used. This provides unconditional secu-
rity against both classical and quantum eavesdrop-
pers [20]. The resulting key is called the secret key
or the final key. It is the output of a QKD protocol.
Post-processing procedures require communication be-
tween Alice and Bob over a classical channel. This chan-
nel is not necessarily private (Eve is freely allowed to
eavesdrop), but it must be authentic, i.e. Eve can nei-
ther change the messages sent via this channel nor send
her own messages without being detected. To provide the
authenticity of the classical channel, Alice and Bob uses
message authentication codes. There are unconditionally
secure message authentication codes [21–23].
Remark 1. Classically, the parameter estimation stage
precedes the information reconciliation [2]. The QBER
value is estimated by random sampling from the sifted
keys (of course, being publicly announced this sample is
discarded from the sifted keys). In our scheme, following
Ref. [17], the QBER value is determined after the infor-
mation reconciliation and verification stages. Clearly, the
straightforward comparison of the keys before and after
the error correction procedure provides the exact num-
ber of corrected errors and corresponding QBER value.
This allows one to avoid discarding a part of the sifted
keys. This scheme was also used in the recently suggested
symmetric blind information reconciliation method [19].
The results of the statistical analysis of decoy states are
used in the privacy amplification stage to calculate the
length of the final key (contraction rate) which provides
the required degree of security. For the BB84 protocol,
the formula is as follows [24, 25]:
lsec = κˆ
l
1lver[1− h(eˆu1)]− leakec + 5 log2 εpa, (1)
where lver is the length of the verified key, leakec the
amount of information (number of bits) about the sifted
keys leaked to Eve during the information reconciliation
stage,
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) (2)
is the binary entropy function, and εpa is a tolerable fail-
ure probability for the privacy amplification stage. It can
be interpreted as a probability that the privacy amplifi-
cation stage has not destroyed all of Eve’s information
on the verified key and, so Eve has partial non-negligible
information on the final key.
Further, κˆl1 is a lower bound on the fraction of bits in
the verified key obtained from single-photon pulses, and
eˆu1 is an upper bound on the fraction of errors in such
positions in the sifted keys. It is assumed that the bits
of the verified keys obtained from multiphoton pulses are
known to the eavesdropper. The quantity h(eˆu1) deter-
mines the potential knowledge of the bits obtained from
single-photon pulses by the eavesdropper. This reflects
the essence of QKD: it is impossible to get knowledge
of the bits of the sifted key obtained from single-photon
pulses without introducing errors in them. The estima-
tion κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1 is the purpose of the decoy statistics anal-
ysis, which is given in the next section and is the main
subject of the present paper. The failure probability for
these estimates (the probability that at least one of these
estimates is not true) must not be greater than some
value εdecoy.
If lsec given by Eq. (1) is positive, then the secret key
distribution is possible. If τ is the time needed to gen-
erate a verified key with the length lver, then the secret
key rate can be defined as follows:
Rsec = lsec/τ. (3)
Remark 2. Let us comment on expression (1). Essen-
tially, it is taken from Ref. [24], where a rigorous proof
of unconditional security of the BB84 protocol is given.
Strictly speaking, the proof was given for the case when
the QBER is estimated by random sampling from the
sifted keys (see Remark 1). However, the scheme when
the QBER is estimated after the information reconcilia-
tion, simplifies the proof and formulas, since, in this case,
the QBER is estimated not probabilistically but deter-
ministically. Actually, the function εpe(ν) in Theorem 3
in Ref. [24], which is the probability that the QBER es-
timation is incorrect, can be set to zero for all ν.
The total failure probability of the QKD system is the
sum of the failure probabilities of each component: ver-
3ification, authentication, privacy amplification, and sta-
tistical estimations of κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1 :
εqkd = εver + εaut + εpa + εdecoy. (4)
Here εver is the probability that verification hash tags
of Alice and Bob coincide, whereas their keys after the
information reconciliation do not, and εaut is the prob-
ability that message authentication codes do not detect
Eve’s interference into the classical channel.
The meaning of the total failure probability εqkd is as
follows: the key generated by the QKD protocol is indis-
tinguishable from the perfectly secure key in any possible
context (any possible application of this key) with the ex-
ception probability at most εqkd (see Ref. [26]).
Remark 3. More precisely, εqkd is the trace distance be-
tween the actual joint classical-quantum state of Alice,
Bob, and Eve and the ideal one, which corresponds to the
case when Alice and Bob either have aborted the proto-
col or Alice’s and Bob’s keys coincide and are completely
uncorrelated with Eve’s state. But εqkd as a failure prob-
ability, the real state coincides with the ideal with the
probability of at least 1 − εqkd [20]. The derivation of
formula (4) is given in the Appendix.
III. DECOY-STATE STATISTICS PROCESSING
Let us describe the estimations of κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1 used in
Eq. (1). Here we adopt a finite-key version of the de-
coy statistics analysis described in Ref. [11]. Namely, in
each round Alice sends to Bob a fixed number N pulses.
Each pulse has the “signal intensity” µ > 0 with the
probability pµ, or the “decoy intensity” ν > 0 with the
probability pν , or the “vacuum intensity” λ ≥ 0 with the
probability pλ = 1− pµ − pν . We note that the intensity
of the “vacuum state” λ is close to zero, but not exactly
zero due to the technical reasons. In our consideration
we assume λ = 0.01. In fact, the “vacuum intensity” is
the second decoy intensity. It is required that λ < ν/2
and λ + ν < µ. Signal pulses are used to establish the
raw key (and then the sifted, verified, and secret keys),
whereas decoy pulses are used to estimate κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1 .
Let N be the total number of pulses sent by Alice,
Nµ, Nν , and Nλ be the numbers of signal, decoy, and vac-
uum pulses sent by Alice (generally, they do not coincide
with pµN , pνN , and pλN due to statistical fluctuations,
but, of course, Nµ+Nν+Nλ = N), and nµ, nν , nλ be the
numbers of the corresponding pulses registered by Bob.
Further, letQµ the probability that a signal pulse is regis-
tered by Bob, Qν and Qλ the corresponding probabilities
for decoy and vacuum pulses, and Q1 be the joint prob-
ability that a pulse contains a single photon and that it
is registered. Then
θ1 = Q1/Qµ (5)
is the probability that a bit in the sifted (as well as veri-
fied) key is obtained from a single-photon pulse. Finally,
let κ1 be the actual fraction of bits in the verified key
obtained from single-photon pulses (it may differ from θ1
due to statistical fluctuations).
We note that the random variables Nα (α ∈ {µ, ν, λ})
and lverκ1 are binomially distributed. Indeed, each of
N pulses is, for example, a signal pulse with the proba-
bility pµ independently of other pulses, and the number
of the signal pulses Nµ is not fixed (random). Another
probability distribution widely used in QKD is the hy-
pergeometric distribution arising from sampling without
replacement. Here (like, e.g., in Ref. [14]) we do not use
sampling without replacement, but use the independent
random choice scheme giving rise to the binomial distri-
bution for the number of choices of a certain alternative
(type of pulse).
If a random variable X follows the binomial distribu-
tion with the number of experiments n and the success
probability in one experiment p, then we will write X ∼
Bi(n, p). Then Nα ∼ Bi(N, pα) and lverκ1 ∼ Bi(lver, θ1).
If the value of Nα is known and fixed (i.e., if we treat it
as non-random), then nα are also binomially distributed:
nα ∼ Bi(Nα, Qα). Indeed, each pulse of a given type is
detected with the probability Qα independently of other
pulses of this type.
In order to estimate κ1 from below, we should estimate
θ1 from below. To do this, we should estimate Q1 from
below and Qµ from above.
According to Ref. [11], the lower bound for Q1 is as
follows:
Q1 ≥ µe
−µ
ν
(
1− νµ
)
− λ
(
1− λµ
)×
×
[
Qνe
ν −Qλeλ − ν
2 − λ2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y l0)
]
,
(6)
where
Y l0 = max
{
νQλe
λ − λQνeν
ν − λ , 0
}
(7)
is the lower bound for the probability that Bob obtains a
click event provided that the pulse contains no photons.
The estimates of Qµ, Qν and Qλ are given by:
Qˆα = nα/Nα, α = µ, ν, λ. (8)
Here and in the following the notation without a “hat”
denotes a true value of a probability (a parameter in the
binomial distribution), while the notation with a “hat”
denotes its statistical estimate (i.e., a random variable).
Due to the central limit theorem, the distribution of
the random variable Qˆα is well approximated by the nor-
mal distribution with the mean Qα and standard devia-
tion
√
Qα(1−Qα)/Nα. If we denote
ϕ = Φ−1
(
1− εdecoy
a
)
, (9)
where Φ−1 is the quantile function for the standard nor-
mal distribution and a is some constant to be specified,
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Figure 1. Comparison of the proposed parameter estimation procedure with the theoretical limit for relevant parameters of the
QKD setup. In (a) sifted and secret keys rates are presented as functions of the communication distance. In (b) the optimized
intensities for signal and decoy states, together with optimized intensity for signal states in the limit case, are shown as functions
of the communication distance. In (c) the optimized fraction of decoy-states probabilities as functions of the communication
distance are given. We note that the fraction of signal states is given by pµ = 1− (pν + pλ).
then
P
Qα − Qˆα ≥ ϕ
√
Qα(1−Qα)
Nα
 ≤ εdecoy
a
. (10)
This gives lower and upper bounds on Qα:
Qˆu,lα = Qˆα ± ϕ
√
Qˆα(1− Qˆα)
Nα
. (11)
Each bound is satisfied with the probability not less than
1 − εdecoy/a. We will need the upper bound on Qµ and
two-sided bounds on Qν and Qλ. These five bounds are
simultaneously satisfied with the probability not less than
1− 5εdecoy/a. Substitution of these bounds into Eq. (6)
yields:
Q1 ≥ µe
−µ
ν
(
1− νµ
)
− λ
(
1− λµ
)×
×
[
Qˆlνe
ν − Qˆuλeλ −
ν2 − λ2
µ2
(Qˆuµe
µ − Yˆ l0)
]
≡ Qˆl1,
(12)
where
Yˆ l0 = max
{
νQˆlλe
λ − λQˆuνeν
ν − λ , 0
}
. (13)
Thus, we arrive at the following expression:
θ1 ≥ Qˆ
l
1
Qˆuµ
= θˆl1 (14)
with the probability not less than 1 − 5εdecoy/a. The
actual fraction κ1 is estimated from below as
κ1 ≥ θ1 − ϕ
√
θ1(1− θ1)
lver
. (15)
with the probability not less than 1− εdecoy/a, or,
κ1 ≥ θˆl1 − ϕ
√
θˆl1(1− θˆl1)
lver
≡ κˆl1. (16)
with the probability not less than 1−6εdecoy/a. We have
obtained one of two estimates participating in Eq. (1).
Let us now find an upper bound for the error rate of
the single-photon states. Though the formulas of these
bounds are known (see Ref. [11]), the use of the binomial
distribution should be analyzed in more detail. If Eve
performs a coherent attack, then the errors in different
positions of the keys cannot be treated as independent
events. However, we are going to show that we can still
use the binomial distribution.
Let ni and ei denote the number of bits in the veri-
fied key obtained from the i-photon pulses and the error
rate in the i-photon states, respectively (i.e., niei is the
number of errors in the bits obtained from the i-photon
pulses). Also let eµ denotes the total error rate (QBER)
for signal pulses. Then
lvereµ =
∞∑
i=0
niei ≤ e0n0 + e1n1, (17)
e1 ≤ lvereµ − e0n0
n1
=
eµ − e0n0/lver
κ1
, (18)
where we have used n1 = κ1lver, by definition of κ1. Ob-
viously, the probability of error for a vacuum pulse is
1/2 for both natural noise and Eve’s attack. Indeed,
if there is no eavesdropping, then only dark counts can
cause the click event on the Bob’s side. If the Bob’s
detectors are identical, then they have equal probabili-
ties of a click. Moreover, if they are memoryless (after
a certain dead time), then the error events in vacuum
pulses are independent from each other. Now consider
the case of the presence of Eve. She has no way of know-
ing about the bit sent by Alice since the pulse contains
no photons. The only thing she can do is to send her own
pulse. But since she does not know the Alice’s bit, her bit
5can be either correct or not with equal probabilities and
independently of the correctness of other bits. Hence,
e0n0 ∼ Bi(n0, 1/2) for a fixed n0. But n0 is also a bino-
mially distributed random variable. For each of Nµ signal
pulses, the joint probability that a signal pulse contains
zero photons, the basis choices of Alice and Bob coincide,
and Bob has a click event is e−µY0/2 [see Eq. (7)]. Hence,
n0 ∼ Bi(Nµ, e−µY0/2), e0n0 ∼ Bi(Nµ, e−µY0/4),
e0n0 ≥ Nµe
−µY l0
4
− ϕ
√
Nµ
e−µY l0
4
(
1− e
−µY l0
4
)
≡ υ,
(19)
and
e1 ≤ eµ − υ/lver
κˆl1
≡ eˆu1 (20)
with the probability not less than 1− εdecoy/a.
Thus, all statistical estimates are satisfied with the
probability not less than 1− 7εdecoy/a. Since they must
be satisfied with the probability not less than 1− εdecoy,
we set a = 7.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We then consider realization of the described proce-
dure on the realistic “plug-and-play” QKD setup [27] and
compare the obtained results with theoretical limitations.
The parameters of the QKD setup implementation are as
follows: number of pulses in train 5×104, repetition rate
of pulses in train 300 MHz, storage line length 17 km,
detectors efficiency 10%, detectors dead time 1 µs, dark
count probability 3 × 10−7, additional losses on Bob’s
side 5 dB, fiber attenuation coefficient 0.2 dB/km, and
interference visibility 97%.
The parameters of the post-processing procedure are
as follows:
εver = εaut = εpa = εdecoy = 10
−12. (21)
The information leakage on the procedure of error cor-
rection and verification are [19]:
leakec = fech(eµ), fec = 1.15. (22)
The length of processed block lver is limited by the value
of 16 Mbits or the length of sifted key accumulated after
30 min of the operation of the QKD setup. We use the
differential evolution method for numerical optimization
of signal and decoy intensities (µ and ν) together with
their generation probabilities (pµ and pν). The “vacuum
intensity” is fixed at the level λ = 0.01, and its generation
probability is given by pλ = 1− pµ − pν . The results are
presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
We then compare the results given by our approach
with the theoretic limit, where we neglect statistical fluc-
tuations and assume that we know the exact values of κ1
Figure 2. Total number of transmitted pulses N and length of
verified key lver as functions of the communication distance.
In the inset the value of QBER is shown as a function of the
communication distance.
and e1 (i.e., there is no need in statistical estimates and
decoy states, pµ = 1, pν = pλ = 0). In the theoretical
limit, the secret key rate is given by the expression:
R∗sec = Rsift{κ1[1− h(e1)]− fech(eµ)}, (23)
where Rsift is the sifted key rate. The quantities Rsift,
κ1, e1, and eµ in Eq. (23) depend on the intensity of
signal pulses (µ∗ for the theoretical limit case). These
quantities are obtained from the numerical optimization
of the intensities for various communication distances.
The results of the comparison of our approach and the-
oretical limit are presented in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1(a) it is
shown that the proposed approach rather closely approx-
imates the theoretical limit on distances up to 100–120
km. The optimal operating of post-processing procedures
on such distances is important, in particular, for inter-
city QKD for future quantum networks.
We note that the sifted key rate in the theoretic limit is
higher due to higher optimal signal intensity [Fig. 1(b)]
and absence of decoy states. Also note that the optimal
fraction of decoy states in the proposed approach is rel-
atively small and is about 5% for distances less than 100
km [see Fig. 1(c)].
V. DEVIATIONS FROM THE GAUSSIAN
DISTRIBUTION
In the discussed approach the statistical fluctuations
are treated in the framework of the central limit theorem,
i.e. we assume that the binomially distributed random
variables (the fraction of positions obtained by single-
photon pulses κ1 and the error rate in these positions e1)
are well approximated by the Gaussian distribution. This
approach is criticized as not sufficiently rigorous [14], in
contrast to other approaches which are more rigorous but
6give slightly worse estimates. Now we are going to esti-
mate deviations from the Gaussian distribution.
Let X ∼ Bi(n, p). Then according to Ref. [15]:
Cn,p(k) ≤ Pr[X ≤ k] ≤ Cn,p(k + 1), (24)
where Cn,p(0) = (1− p)n, Cn,p(n) = 1− pn, and
Cn,p(k) = Φ
(
sgn
(
k
n − p
)√
2nH
(
k
n , p
))
(25)
for k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
Φ(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−t
2/2dt, (26)
H(x, p) = x ln
x
p
+ (1− x) ln 1− x
1− p , (27)
and sgn(x) = x/|x| for x 6= 0 and sgn(0) = 0.
If k = np+ϕ
√
np(1− p), then it is straightforward to
show using Taylor’s theorem (for n→∞) that
Cn,p(k) = Φ(ϕ)− ϕ
2(1− 2p)e−ϕ2/2
6
√
2pinp(1− p) +O(
1
n ), (28a)
Cn,p(k + 1) = Φ(ϕ)− ϕ
2(1− 2p)e−ϕ2/2
6
√
2pinp(1− p)
+
e−ϕ
2/2√
2pinp(1− p) +O(
1
n ). (28b)
We see that the deviations from the Gaussian distribution
become significant for small n or p close to 0 or 1.
In Equations (11), (16), and (19) we took ϕ such that
Φ(ϕ) = 1− εdecoy
7
(29)
[see Eq. (9)] for εdecoy = 10
−12, i.e., ϕ ≈ 7.30. But the
precise value ε′decoy of the failure probability is given by
Pr[X ≤ np+ ϕ
√
np(1− p)] = 1− ε
′
decoy
7
. (30)
Eqs. (28) can be used to estimate the difference between
the precise value ε′decoy and the required value εdecoy.
Let us consider the worst-case scenarios for esti-
mates (11), (16), and (19). In Eq. (11), the minimal
possible Nα is Nλ ∼ 108 (when the length is close to
zero) and all Qˆα are at least of the order 10
−7 (they are
bounded from below by dark count probability with a
dead time corrections). The substitution of these worst-
case parameters n = 108 and p = 10−7 to Eq. (28) gives
ε′decoy − εdecoy ≈ 2 · 10−15  εdecoy = 10−12. (31)
In Eq. (16), the worst-case parameters are n = lver = 10
5
and p = θ1 ≈ 0.47 (corresponding to the maximal length
155 km):
ε′decoy − εdecoy ≈ 1.5 · 10−16  εdecoy = 10−12. (32)
In Eq. (19), we always have Y l0 = 0, so, in fact, we do
not perform the statistical estimation and use a trivial
estimate n0e0 ≥ 0. We see that the precise value ε′decoy
may exceed the required value εdecoy only by a negligi-
ble quantity. The higher-order corrections to the Gaus-
sian distribution with respect to n−1/2 are even smaller.
Thus, for practical parameters one can use the proposed
formulas based on the Gaussian distribution.
Derivation of a general procedure for decoy state statis-
tics processing based on rigorous formula (24) will be a
subject for a subsequent work.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a sort of the decoy state statistics
processing. The final formulas are (16) and (20), which
give the statistical estimates used in the formula for the
length of the final secret key (1).
Also we claim that the failure probability εdecoy for the
decoy states statistical estimates should be treated as an
additional term in the total failure probability εqkd in
Eq. (4). Usually, one simply puts εdecoy = εpa and not
treat it as an additional term in the total failure proba-
bility. From the point of view of the rigorous theory, this
is not correct: formula (1) provides the failure probabil-
ity at most εpa only for true single-photon sources or, at
least, when we can estimate κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1 with certainty. If
we cannot estimate these quantities with certainty, the
failure probability of the estimate should be included as
an additional term in the the total failure probability of
the QKD system. The appendix is devoted to the rigor-
ous derivation of Eq. (4) for the total failure probability.
Finally, we have shown that, for practical parameters,
deviations of the binomially distributed random variables
used in the decoy states statistics processing from the
Gaussian distribution can be neglected.
The suggested option for the decoy-state processing
is implemented in the proof-of-principle realization of
the post-processing procedure for industrial QKD sys-
tems [18], which is freely available under GNU general
public license (GPL) [28]. This procedure is used in the
modular QKD setup described in Ref. [27].
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7APPENDIX. DERIVATION OF THE FORMULA
FOR THE FAILURE PROBABILITY
This section is devoted to the derivation of formula (4).
According to the results of Ref. [29]:
εqkd = εcorr + εsec, (A1)
where εcorr and εsec stand for correctness (coincidence
of Alice’s and Bob’s final keys) and secrecy (ignorance of
Eve about the final key), respectively. Namely, εcorr is the
probability that Alice’s and Bob’s keys do not coincide,
but the protocol was not aborted, and εsec is the trace
distance between the actual joint classical-quantum state
of Alice and Eve and the ideal one. In our case,
εcorr = εver + εaut, (A2)
i.e., the Alice’s and Bob’s final keys coincide in the case
of coincidence of their verification hash tags and their au-
thentication hash tags (otherwise Eve could interfere into
their communication and fake the verification tags). So,
the failure probability for correctness is the sum of failure
probabilities of the verification and authentication.
Further, in the case of single-photon sources, εsec = εpa
(see, Ref. [24]). In this case we can estimate κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1
in Eq. (1) with certainty. If we cannot estimate these
quantities with certainty, the failure probability of the
estimate should be included as an additional term in the
total failure probability of the QKD system:
εsec = εpa + εdecoy. (A3)
A mathematical fact justifying expression Eq. (A3) is as
follows. Consider two classical-quantum states:
ρXY =
∑
x∈X
px |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρY |x, (A4)
σXY =
∑
x∈X
px |x〉 〈x| ⊗ σY |x, (A5)
where X is a finite set, px are probabilities. Let, further,
Ω ⊂ X (event), Ω = X\Ω, p(Ω) = ∑x∈Ω px,
ρXE|Ω =
1
p(Ω)
∑
x∈Ω
px |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρE|x, (A6)
σXE|Ω =
1
p(Ω)
∑
x∈Ω
px |x〉 〈x| ⊗ σE|x, (A7)
ρXE = p(Ω)ρXE|Ω + (1− p(Ω))ρXE|Ω, (A8)
σXE = p(Ω)σXE|Ω + (1− p(Ω))σXE|Ω, (A9)
D(ρXE|Ω, σXE|Ω) ≤ ε1, (A10)
where D is the trace distance (for details, see Refs. [20,
26]) and p(Ω) ≥ 1− ε2. Then
D(ρXE , σXE) = p(Ω)D(ρXE|Ω, σXE|Ω)
+ (1− p(Ω))D(ρXE|Ω, σXE|Ω)
≤ (1− ε2)ε1 + ε2
≤ ε1 + ε2,
(A11)
where we have used that the trace distance does not ex-
ceed unity. In our case X is the set of all pairs (κ1, e1),
Ω is the subset corresponding to the event
(κ1 ≥ κˆl1 and e1 ≤ eˆu1), (A12)
ε1 = εpa, ε2 = εdecoy, (A10) is the trace distance be-
tween the actual and the ideal final states of the protocol
conditioned on the event that the statistical estimates of
κ1 and e1 are true, and, finally, (A11) is the total trace
distance between the actual and the ideal final states of
the protocol.
Remark 4. In Ref. [30], another formula relating the fail-
ure probability and trace distance is used: if ε is the
failure probability, then the trace distance between the
actual and the ideal state is bounded from above by√
ε(2− ε), instead of linear formulas (4) and (A3). The
reason is the difference between the techniques of security
proofs. In Ref. [30], entanglement-distillation technique
was assumed. Its final result is expressed in terms of
fidelity F (ρ, σ) between the actual joint state of Alice,
Bob, and Eve ρ and the ideal one σ. If F (ρ, σ) ≥ 1 − ε,
then the trace distance is bounded by
D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 ≤
√
ε(2− ε). (A13)
In contrast, proofs of Refs. [24, 25, 31] are information-
theoretic and their results are direct bounds on the trace
distance (the leftover hash lemma is essentially the main
ingredient yielding such a If we cannot estimatebound).
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